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of valuation studies identifies a range of values placed on developed and undeveloped 
coastline for both users and local property owners. These values were then used in a model 
to evaluate policy options to control development of a stretch of coastline. The model 
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Abstract 
This paper examines existing measures taken to protect the coastal zones of the Meditterranean 
Sea and assesses their success. A summary of the main pressures facing these zones is given, 
followed by an analysis of the legislation covering coastal zone development in ten countries: 
Algeria, Croatia, Egypt, France, Israel, Italy, Malta, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey. We find that not 
all of these states have legislation specifically covering coastal zones, but there is concern in all 
areas that the legislation is not working, 
We also look at the costs and benefits of controlling coastal development. Firstly, a literature 
review of valuation studies identifies a range of values placed on developed and undeveloped 
coastline for both users and local property owners. These values were then used in a model to 
evaluate policy options to control development of a stretch of coastline. The model indicates that a 
stricter control regime of coastal development may provide significant benefits. 
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 1.  Introduction 
It is widely acknowledged that the coastal zones of the Mediterranean are coming under increasing 
pressure, which in turn is having serious implications for the environment and for the sustainable 
use of these highly valued ecosystems.  All the littoral states have undertaken some measures to 
try and protect their coastal zones from overdevelopment, or development that is socially and 
environmentally damaging.  The success of these measures, however, is questionable.  In spite of 
well-reasoned and carefully drafted regulations, the pressure has continued to increase.  The laws 
are often ignored by developers who put up illegal units. In this and other ways the regulations are 
ineffective in achieving the key goals of sustainable development: i.e. development that protects 
the environment for present and future generations to enjoy. 
 
This background paper is structured as follows.  Section II summarizes the changes in the use of 
coastal land in the Mediterranean region over the last 30-40 years through the presentation of a 
number of key indicators.  Section III reports on the legal framework for 10 littoral states (Algeria, 
Croatia, Egypt, France, Israel, Italy, Malta, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey
i).  A review of the laws and 
their effectiveness leads to some proposals as to what works in protecting the coasts and what does 
not  work.    These  are  discussed  in  the  conclusions.    Section  IV  lays  out  the  evidence  on  the 
economic estimates of the value of visual amenities in general and of coastlines in particular.  It 
reports on studies carried out in Europe and the US that have valued the benefits of a sea view and 
access to the sea to those who have property overlooking it.  It also reports on studies of the costs 
of different types of building development on the enjoyment of those who are not owners of the 
properties and whose access and enjoyment of the property has been affected.  Section V uses the 
estimates  from  these  studies  to  value  different  conservation  or  development  policies  for 
‘representative’  coastal  areas,  with  typical  land  values,  rates  of  visitation  etc.    Section  VI 
concludes  with  some  general  comments  on  the  implications  of  the  economic  analysis  for 4 
development  and  conservation  policy  in  coastal  zones  and  some  proposals  to  make  existing 
regulations more effective and to introduce new regulations where appropriate. 
 
2. Increasing Coastal Pressures In The Mediterranean 
There is ample documented evidence that the human pressure on coastal resources is increasing.  
Table 1 gives some basic data for the countries covered in this study.  In the 30 years to 2000 
densities in coastal areas increased by 49 percent, ranging from a low of 5 percent in Croatia, to a 
high of 112 percent in Algeria
ii.  The same period has also seen substantial increases in tourist 
densities in all countries except Egypt.  Values for the others range from 25 percent in Spain to 73 
percent in Turkey.  In general the North African countries with the fast growing populations are 
also the ones with the highest rates of growth of coastal densities, including tourism densities 
(Algeria, Tunisia and Turkey). 
We also observe some shift in the relative densities of the population between the coastal zones 
and the national average.  The last column of Table 1 gives the percentage change in this ratio 
between 1970 and 2000.  It shows a relative movement outward for Croatia, France, Italy, Spain 
and Turkey.  In Algeria, Egypt and Israel the density has increased slightly faster on average than 
it has in the coastal zones.  
 
Table 1: Indicators of Coastal Zone Pressure in the Mediterranean 
Country  % Increase in 
coastal 
residential 
density 1970 to 
2000 










Algeria  112  34  -2 
Croatia  5  n.a.  4 
Egypt  104  -89  -1 
France  31  38  12 5 
Israel  92  72  -3 
Italy  8  29  1 
Malta  22  38  0 
Spain  27  25  8 
Tunisia  90  50  0 
Turkey  107  73  13 
All  49     
Source: Plan Bleu, 1989, 2005, Attané and Courbage, 2001 
 
In view of these strong human pressures on coastal zones, it is clear that increased regulations may 
be warranted to protect the resources.   The next section looks at the present regulatory framework 
and assesses its efficiency. 
 
3. Regulations Governing Coastlines In The Mediterranean  
All the countries reviewed in this study have some form of regulation that applies to coastal areas.  
They differ, however, in many respects.  Some have specific laws that deal with coastal zones and 
some expressly forbid construction or development in a ‘no build area’ that varies from country to 
country.  The definition of what constitutes a littoral zone also varies across countries (the no build 
area and the littoral zone are not the same).  Others rely on the application of general planning 














Limits set by law  Sanctions  Special features of the country situation 
Algeria  (1)  Yes. 2002 
Law 
Littoral zone is from 800m 
to 25 km.  Also defines 
littoral plain of 3km.  No 






No assessment of effectiveness of laws.  
Concentration of activities in littoral areas has 
continued very fast.  Anarchy has characterized its 
coastal urban development. 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
No  No limits set by law. 
Construction limits defined 
by regulation plans. 
Law on Physical 
Planning and Land 
defines sanctions 
and competencies 
of urban and 
construction 
inspectors. 
The Law on Physical Planning and Land Use 
defines conditions for construction. A competent 
body issues construction permit after urban 
consent. A competent body issues urban consent 
according to the regulation plan and urban project. 
 
Croatia (2)  Yes 2004 
Regulation 
Marine property is 6 metres 
strip. Law of 2004 defines 
coastal zone of 1000 meters. 
No construction within 70 
metres (housing) and 100 m 
(tourism) in urban areas and 
100 m in other areas. 
Fines and 
demolition of 
illegal units with 
owners paying the 
cost. 
Plans for land use are general with insufficiently 
strong instruments of management or 
implementation.  Coastal towns, however, have 
retained their typical features.  Pressure though 
still low is increasing with illegal dwellings. 
Egypt  Yes.  Very general littoral zone 
(up to 30 km.).  No building 
normally within 200 metres. 
Building with 200m requires 
an EIA. 
Fines and possible 
demolition. 
Laws are not well enforced. Poor coordination 
between authorities and overlapping and 
conflicting responsibilities result in severe and 
increasing pressure.  A framework programme for 
ICZM was issued in 1996 and steps are being 




Yes  Littoral zone is defined by 
coastal municipalities.  No 
building within 100 metres. 
Fines and 
demolition. 
Considerable illegal construction, more or less 
tolerated by authorities.  Public management of 
these areas needs strengthening.  ICZM is weak 
because of a plethora of laws and planning 
instruments that are poorly coordinated. 2 
 







Limits set by law  Sanctions  Special features of the country situation 
Israel  Yes  Varies from 1-2 km.  No 
building allowed within 100 
metres. 
Fines.  Most land is under national ownership so access 
should not be a problem.  But the national Land 
Administration has joined Local Authorities to 
‘privatize’ a lot of coastal land which has reduced 
public access to beaches.  There is a lot of 
pressure to further convert coastal areas into 
housing.  The new Coastline Protection Law is 
sound in principle but implementation is crucial. 
Italy  Yes  Varies according to 
ecological region.  No 
building within 300 metres.  





Coastal planning is conflicting and fragmented 
between different levels of government.  Frequent 
amnesties on illegal construction have resulted in 
a large level of infringement.  More than two 
illegal actions per kilometre of coast.  Many are 
luxury developments.  Yet some regional 
initiatives are encouraging.  In Liguria a coastal 
plan has been prepared which pays special 
attention to the preservation of special areas.  In 
Sardinia a wider restriction of on average 2 km 
has been introduced. Building inside this zone is 
only possible as part of an urban upgrading or 
conversion program. 
Malta  No  Littoral zone is 250 metres.  
No construction within zone 
of variable depth. 
Fines  Very great pressure to develop along the coast.  
The privatization of the coastline is proceeding 
fast and access to the sea is diminishing. 
Morocco  Draft  
Law 
No construction within 100m 
besides for activities that 
require the nearness of the 
sea. 
   3 
  
 








Limits set by law  Sanctions  Special features of the country situation 
Spain  Yes  Land bound limit is 500 
metres.  Construction allowed 
within 100-200 metres is 
restricted but not banned. 
Fines but with a 
statute limiting 
action to 12 
months.  If no legal 
action is taken 
there is no 
sanction. 
Poor coordination between authorise has resulted 
in very fast coastal urbanization.  A lot of illicit 
building has been taking place and is still ongoing.  
There has been considerable controversy on the 
modification of the Shores Act, which was basis 
of coastal regulation.  Amendments allow urban 
plans to override coastal zone protection 
legislation and make the case for development in 
costal areas easier. 
Tunisia  Yes  Limits vary from site to site.  
No construction is permitted 
within 100 metres. Within 
settlements construction is 
permitted within 25m. 
In many cases the 
authorities reach an 
agreement with the 





Minor infringements are declining but some major 
tourist developments remain problematic vis-à-vis 
the law.  Studies are under way to identify areas 
that need protection but implementation of the 
plans will need funding which is difficult to get. 
Turkey (3)  No  Landward limit is 100 metres 
and is uniform along the 
whole coast.  Construction 
prohibited within 50 metres 
but exceptions are made. 
Fines and in 
principle 
demolitions are 
available but they 
are rarely used. 
Implementation of coastal management is very 
weak.  The settlements law has been highly 
misused for improper developments of secondary 
housing.  ‘Local land use plans’ are often careless 
and override urban planning at higher level. 1 
 
The main comments are the following: 
 
1.  Six of the ten countries have some form of coastal zone legislation regarding development.  
Others  rely  on  the  normal  land  use  regulations  and  apply  them  to  coastal  areas  as 
appropriate.    There  is,  however,  in  almost  all  countries,  an  expressed  concern  that  the 
planning  process  is  not  working  adequately.    ICZM  is  being  hampered  by  a  lack  of 
coordination between the regulating authorities (e.g. those responsible for land and sea and 
those  responsible  for  different  levels  of  government).    The  presence  of  specific  coastal 
legislation does not appear to guarantee a better performance in terms of coastal protection. 
 
2.  The definitions of littoral zones vary.  Where a figure is specified it is in the range of 100 
metres to as much as 2 kilometres.  The non-building zone (setback zone) can be as small as 
50 metres and as much as 500 metres.  It should be noted, however, that in several countries 
the ban on construction of dwellings within this zone is not absolute (non dwellings can be 
allowed if required for safety or provision of essential services).  Exemptions are given, 
although it is not known how frequently this happens. 
 
3.  The sanctions in place are fines and possible demolitions.  The latter are rarely used, and in a 
number of countries some form of amnesty is applied for dwellings that have been in place 
for some time (e.g. Italy, Spain and France).  Tolerance for infringements seems to be high 
in these three countries and also in Croatia, Tunisia and Turkey. 
 
4.  There is limited information on the efficacy of the regulations.  The only quantitative data 
that could be obtained was for Italy, which indicated at least two major infringements per 2 
kilometre  of  coast  per  year.    Data  may  be  available  for  other  countries  but  it  was  not 
accessible through the databases and websites to which the public has access.  This makes it 
difficult to assess the extent of the problem, but the qualitative reports all reach the same 
conclusion – i.e. that the regulations are frequently evaded or interpreted in such a way as to 
suit the developers. 
 
5.  Not all is gloom, however, and there are some indications that things can work.  The cases of 
Liguria and Sardinia are examples of regional governments taking the problem seriously and 
making regulations that are substantially protective of coastal zones.  The case of Sardinia is 
particularly interesting in showing what can be done with the right political will (see Box 1). 
In Tunisia detailed studies are being undertaken of where protection is most needed and 
plans  in  support  of  these  are  being  drawn  up.    More  generally  there  is  an  increasing 
awareness of the need to make the regulations that manage the coastal zones more effective 
and more protective of these fragile environmentally stressed areas. 
 
It is not possible to establish how effective the different instruments such as setback policies and 
other regulations have been in protecting coastal zones. We do not have a detailed assessment of 
the extent of violation of the setback rule and in any case that would only be a small indication of 
the  status  of  the  coasts:  for  example  with  a  small  setback  area,  and  a  policy  of  intense 
development close to the sea one can end up with a coastal zone that is substantially developed.   
In Figure 1 the percentage of land that is built up within one kilometre and ten kilometres of the 
sea is given for two years (1990 and 2000) and for three countries: France, Italy and Spain.   The 
graph shows that development in all three Mediterranean countries has increased in both zones 
over those ten years.  The increases are not large in the one kilometre zone (about half to one 
percentage of the area) but this has also been a time when awareness of the need to protect coastal 3 
zones was increasing.  More generally, as the data presented in Section II show, the pressure on 
the coastal zones is not abating.  Action is therefore needed to draw up the regulations that exist 
more effective and to introduce new regulations where appropriate.  These are discussed in the last 
section of the paper. 4 
 
Box 1: The Piano Paessagistico in Sardinia 
 
In an interview given to EcoMEDia magazine in April 2007, Renato Soru, president 
of Sardinia explained that, “in order to stop Sardinia from becoming a continuous 
coastal  sprawl,  boost  economic  development  in  existing  coastal  settlements  and 
promote  a  model  of  sustainable  tourism  that  ensures  the  participation  of  local 
communities”  the Regional Landscape Plan (Piano Paesaggistico Regionale or 
PPR) was adopted by the Sardinian regional council at the end of 2006. 
 
The  aim  of  the  PPR  is  to  meet  the  objectives  of  the  Integrated  Coastal  Area 
Management Protocol (ICAM).  The whole territory has been divided into 27 coastal 
areas and building in most of these has been declared unlawful on any part of the 
coastline.  You can only upgrade what has already been built, and the authorities 
offer incentives to those willing to improve the architectural and urban quality of 
existing structures. Furthermore, incentives are being provided for the transformation 
of holiday homes into accommodation facilities, offering a slight increase in building 
cubature to bring about the required functional changes.  
One of the aims is to prevent development of coastal developments that are only for 
tourists  and  that  become  ghost  towns  outside  the  tourist  season.    Thus  tourist 
infrastructures are only allowed to expand (if at all) if they are integrated with local 
villages.  As Mr. Soru says, "it has now been widely understood that the PPR has 
nothing against small coastal towns; on the contrary, it is there to protect them and 
ensure that no one,  ever again,  can buy  a piece of land for a pittance and build 
another tourist resort in a prime position on the waterfront, turning its back both 
physically and metaphorically to the community".  Presently 87% of second homes 
are built on the coastline. 
Now, a few months after its adoption the PPR is being recognized as a tool for better 
coastal management although not everything has been smooth going. The original 
aim  to  increase  capacity  for  tourism  by  80,000  beds  is  unlikely  to  be  met.    
Moreover, the plan has led to the stop of several urbanization projects in urban areas, 
such as Cagliari, generating heavy local conflicts. On the other hand interest in sub-
coastal settlements is clearly growing, while they used to have very limited appeal in 
the past.  
 
 Slowly people are becoming aware that the value and future of a territory does not 
depend on what has been built, but on what has not yet been built.  President Soru 
makes no secret of the fact that a plan such as the PPR can only be successful if there 
is a strong willpower behind the central administration. "Authorities should not only 
listen to the community, but guide citizens using precise regulations that transcend 
the  interests  of  a  particular  territory,  whilst  offering  wide  and  comprehensive 
regional  scope.  Coastal  development  is  a  problem  that  affects  the  entire 
Mediterranean  region  and  therefore  binding  regulations  should  be  imposed  for 
environmental protection". "In my capacity as a citizen - he ends – “I sincerely hope 
that the Mediterranean will not be transformed into a bath tub with cement walls. If 
people are left to their own devices that's exactly what will happen. It's simply a 
matter of time". 5 
Figure 1: Percent Changes in Built Up Coastal Areas in Three Mediterranean C 
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4. Values of amenities in coastal zones and of landscapes 
Any policy of coastal zone protection and land use planning would benefit from a better idea of 
the benefits and costs associated with different patterns of land use.   The pressure on the coasts is 
coming from individuals who derive benefits from living near the sea.  Yet the same actions are 
causing external costs in the form of reduced visual benefits and reduced access to others who 
enjoyed these environmental services before. 
 
The aim of this section is to report on research that has valued such benefits and costs.  In the next 
section  the  estimates  from  these  studies  are  used  to  evaluate  plausible  but  artificial  coastal 
development plans. 
 6 
There are a few studies available of the value of coastal landscapes.  Here we divide them into 
those that value a landscape for households that own and occupy or households or hotels that rent 
property with a sea view, and those that relate to the value of a landscape from individuals who are 
not occupiers of property on the coast.  The latter are divided into people that visit the coast or live 
in  coastal  areas  but  not  in  close  proximity  to  the  sea,  and  people  that  want  to  see  the  coast 
preserved but do not visit the coast (the so-called non-use values).  Often these two sets of values 
are in conflict: for owners to capture the value of a sea view means detracting from the value those 
visitors may get from access to a sea view or access to a beach or may wish to see it preserved for 
its own sake.  The next section reports on how these conflicting values compare and uses them to 
assess olicy options. 
 
4.1 Values Of Coastal Landscapes For Owners Or Occupiers Of Property 
The technique most used to value the benefits of visual amenities from property is referred to as 
the hedonic method, where house price data are used as the basis for calculating premiums placed 
on houses in locations with different landscape attributes.  In this section studies that value coastal 
and lake views are reported. 
 
Benson  et  al  [1]  conducted  a  hedonic  study  of  the  impact  of  views  on  property  prices  in 
Bellingham, Washington. They found a significant price premium associated with different types 
of views. They derived seven different categories of views finding a premium of 58.9 percent for 
an “unobstructed ocean view” down to 8.2 percent for a “poor partial ocean view”. A lake view 
adds less (18.1 percent) than an ocean view in most cases, but lake-frontage is found to add 126.7 
percent to house prices – capturing aspects of the recreational amenities that are additional to the 
amenity value provided by the view itself.  This study shows the potential for the use of hedonic 7 
analysis to further understanding of the valuation of unimpeded views relative to other types of 
views.  
 
Fraser and Spencer [2] considered the residential land amenity of an ocean view by a scoring 
system based on three sub-characteristics of the view based on housing data from 114 sites in 
Western Australia. The three dimensions they used are degree of panorama, potential loss of view 
and elevation. The potential loss of view dimension introduces both time and uncertainty into 
people’s valuation. They find that the first two characteristics are dominant over the third, which 
was therefore not included.  They also find diminishing marginal utilities to the purchaser as the 
level of each of these characteristics increases.  A scoring matrix was used to determine the quality 
of the ocean view for each site. They estimate that for the best views with the lowest likelihood of 
the view being lost the view adds a premium of an extra 25 percent to the house price.  The 
important point this study makes is that the impact of an ocean view on property will depend on 
how certain the purchaser is that the view will remain and not be blocked in the future. (See also 
Abelson and Markandya, [3]). 
 
Bond  et  al  [4]  investigated  the  impact  of  views  of  Lake  Erie  on  residential  property  using 
transaction based house prices. This was an analysis based on building codes, which reflected 
whether a house had a view or not. Having the desirable view of Lake Erie was shown to add an 
89.9 percent premium to the house price. 
 
Parsons and Wu [5] used a random draw of 1,435 houses sold in 1983 from one county on the 
Chesapeake  Bay  coast,  Maryland,  USA.  They  used  their  findings  to  estimate  the  impact  of 
regulations requiring houses to be built further away from the waterfront by estimating housing 
development  over  time  under  various  restriction  scenarios.  Using  hedonic  analysis,  they 8 
distinguish impacts on three types of properties of different land use regulations: houses with 
frontage, views and distance from the water. They find that the value of lost frontage, views and 
distance leads to a loss of between $74,763 and $96,672 (depending on the econometric model). 
For loss of views and distance alone there is a loss of $6,553 to $7,883, and with distance by itself 
there is a loss of $233 to $524 per property.  Hence the value of frontage alone would be in the 
range $68,880 to $90,119.  As a percentage of the price of a house this amounts to a premium for 
sea frontage of between 75 and 98 percent. 
 
In Europe Luttik [6]  used hedonic analysis to identify price premiums for different landscape 
types in the Netherlands. Using a sample of almost 3000 transactions, Luttik finds a premium for 
houses in attractive landscape types of 5-12 percent over houses in less attractive landscapes. 
Houses overlooking water attract a premium of 8-10 percent, whilst those overlooking open space 
attract a 6-12 percent premium. 
 
Muriel et al [7] conducted a hedonic analysis for Finestère in France. Using a sample of 185 
houses in 2005, they derive a property premium of 78 percent for a house with a good view of the 
sea compared to one without any view of the sea. They also assess the responsiveness of house 
prices to distance from the sea, finding an elasticity of -0.087 – i.e. a one percent increase in 
distance from the sea results in a 0.087 percent decline in property value (at an average distance of 
6.5 kilometre).  So a house that is 3 kilometres from the sea as opposed to 6 kilometres would 
have a value that is 4.3 percent higher.  One that is two kilometres would have a value that is 6 
percent higher.  These numbers look rather low but are the only ones we could find that estimated 
a decay function. 
 9 
A study in Israel (CAMP Israel, [8] estimated increased room rates for hotels along the seashore of 
the country.  It found accommodation within 2km of the coast charged rates that were about 39 
percent higher than in similar classes of hotels further away from the sea. 
 
Although the results do vary by site, there is some agreement across them.  As a rough guide, a 
property with an uninterrupted ocean view will attract a price premium of between 25 and nearly 
100 percent. The premium will be less for a partial view – perhaps a low as 8 percent for a ‘poor 
partial view’.   The Israel study estimates hotel premium rates of 39 percent.  The ‘decay’ function 
with respect to distance from the sea implies a decline in values of about 9 percent for households 
that are up to one kilometre from the sea as opposed to half a kilometre. There is no doubt, 
however, that more studies are needed to answer questions about the impact of density of housing 
and access to the beach on the value of such properties. 
 
4.2 Values Of Coastal Views And Access To Non-Property Owners 
4.2.1 The VOE Approach 
A number of processes can also be used to value coastal views to non-property owners. The most 
common in the literature is often used to value the recreational amenity of a beach, and is known 
as the Value of Enjoyment (VoE) method. This is included in the ‘Yellow Manual’, produced by 
the  Middlesex  University  Flood  Hazard  Research  Centre  (Penning-Rowsell  et  al  [9])  and 
recommended by the UK government for valuing coastal protection (Whitmarsh et al. [10]). It 
elicits  stated  preferences  by  the  use  of  a  direct  open  question  about  the  value  placed  on  the 
enjoyment of a visit to the beach, and so does not require any payment vehicle to be expressed and 
avoids the possible biases that payments vehicles can bring to CVM studies (Marzetti [11],p.17). 
In order to help frame this value, a VoE question should invite a comparison between the beach in 
question and alternative recreation sources. This also brings the respondent to consider the trade-10 
off between using the beach and the alternative sites. As Whitmarsh et al. ([10], p. 455) conclude, 
“By  thus  focussing  on  choice  and  sacrifice,  it  attempts  to  go  to  the  heart  of  the  problem  of 
economic valuation.” However, they also note that VoE results are not limited by people’s income 
(ibid: p.461). 
 
The most useful Mediterranean European data for the value of enjoyment from beach use appear 
to be those from Marzetti [11] and Camp Israel [8]. The former uses Value of Enjoyment surveys 
for four beaches, of which only two have usable survey sizes. The beaches are Lido Di Dante on 
the North Adriatic Cost near Ravenna and the Barcola Seafront in Trieste. The VoE method does 
not require a payment vehicle to be specified. Their mean daily use values are reported in Table 3.  
The Israel study combines travel cost and other revealed expenditure data to estimate the value of 
beach visits.  Its results are discussed further below. 
 
The Marzetti study results in Table 3 show that the figures vary considerably between the two 
sites. The Lido Di Dante has three relatively distinct areas, varying by the levels of development – 
the least developed end is the most popular.  Spring/ Summer values are between €25 and €32 and 
Autumn/ Winter values are between €4 and €20
iv.   The standard deviations are large and do not 
exclude the possibility that the value may be zero for some individuals.  Barcola is a crowded 
beach, and ‘New Beach’ is likely to be primarily used by locals.  Values there are much lower – 
around  €5  to  €8  in  Spring/  Summer  and  €5  to  €6  in  Autumn/Winter.      Again  the  standard 
deviations are large.   
 
Both sites have alternative beaches in the vicinity. We are not told the number of visitors to the 
Lido Di Dante, but we are told that there are 235,000 inhabitants of Trieste, and the survey found 
that 63.8 percent of residents visit the beach and that the beach is primarily used by residents, on 11 
average 20.9
v days per resident. This gives an estimate of beach use of 3.1 million beach visits per 
year. A greater proportion of the town visits the beach in autumn/winter than spring/summer but 
spends a shorter time on the beach. 
 
Table 3: Mean and Std. Deviation of daily use values of Beach Use in Italy (€2003) 
  Spring/Summer  Autumn/Winter  Length of 
Beach 
Lido Di Dante 
    Whole Sample 
     Developed 
Area 
     Semi-
developed Area 



















      Existing 
Seafront 











Source: Marzetti (2003) 
 
4.2.2 Travel Cost and CV Approaches 
The range of values given above is comparable to those found in a wider literature. Whitmarsh et 
al. [10] provide a summary of their own and other studies of coastal recreation. Their valuations 
range from €12.42 to €15.98 for the UK and €4.27 to €52.98 per person per day for the USA (all 
adjusted to 2001€). The large figure in the USA was found using the Travel Cost Method for out-
of-state visitors to Florida. The next highest US study found €15.17 per person per day. The 
studies give no indications of the size of the beaches or the numbers of people visiting.  
 
Landry  and  McConnell’s  2004  study  [12]  used  travel  costs  to  estimate  the  value  placed  on 
recreation at two beaches in Georgia, USA.  The survey was carried out over three seasons with 12 
over 2000 observations, and found valuations of €7.72-€9.16 for one beach and €17.01-€18.75 for 
a nearby alternative. 
 
Sohngen et al. [13] studied visitors to two beaches in State Parks on the coast of Lake Erie, USA. 
One of the beaches is 1 mile (1.61km) long – the longest beach in Ohio – and both beaches have 
other recreational features nearby, such as hiking trails and fishing
vi. They find that the beach with 
more features has a higher valuation (€31.53) than a site that is more beach-focussed (€19.09). 
 
Polomé et al [14] summarised the literature on coastal defense, and in doing so, developed a 
benefit transfer function for beach recreation. They found shortcomings in the data arising from 
studies not presenting the total number of visitors to beaches and numbers of visits per visitor and 
on-site sample bias. They use 106 observations from 38 different sites in the UK, USA and the 
Netherlands. The studies were mainly from the 1990s but went as far back as 1975, and were 
predominantly VoE studies. They find that the average value is around €16 for UK beaches and 
€22 for US beaches (p.837, both figures have been converted to €2001).  There were not enough 
studies to obtain a value for the Netherlands.  However, there is still large uncertainty about these 
figures.  They  give  the  overall  average  value  of  informal  recreation  to  be  approximately  €20 
(€2001) per visit (p. 839).  They also find that the date of the study makes little difference to the 
valuation, i.e. studies in the 1970s give similar valuations to later studies.  On the other hand the 
concept of value used such as VoE, WTP etc, is highly significant in determining the result. This 
could mean that the benefit transfer is flawed, since different types of valuation give different 
results, or it could be that the differences in value are genuine – the USA studies typically used 
Consumer Surplus measures whilst the UK typically used VoE. 
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The  CAMP  study  in  Israel  [8]  provides  some  useful  additional  material  from  another 
Mediterranean littoral state
vii.  Surveys of vacationers were carried out in 1982 and 1994.  Based 
on these the researchers estimated that the 13 million annual beachgoers spent NIS98 million on 
travel to the sites, 25 million on entry fees and 8 million on parking.  In addition another 18 
million persons visited areas close to the beaches, spending NIS79 million. To this total of NIS210 
million they added a consumer surplus of 70 percent, making a total willingness to pay of NIS357 
million
viii in 1999 prices.  Converting to 2001 prices, and euros we get a figure of €3.5 per visitor.  
This is considerably lower than the EU/US values presented previously but then Israel has a lower 
per capita income than the countries from which the other values were obtained. 
 
The Israel study is also valuable as it is the only one that provides an estimate of the non-use 
value
ix.  A 1999 survey asked households what they would be willing to pay to prevent further 
construction on the coast.  The value that emerged was NIS31/year, or around €9.4 in 2001 prices.  
This is significant as it applies in principle to the whole group from which the sample was drawn – 
i.e. the 1.6 million households in the country.  Thus the gross annual WTP amounts to €15 million.  
Some more guesswork is involved in converting this to a value per kilometre of coast.  Of the 
country’s 188 km coastline 50 kilometres are used for national infrastructures and defence uses 
and  are  closed  to  the  public.  The  remaining  coastline  has  been  designated  as  follows:  59 
kilometres as municipal shores (adjacent to urban settlements), 43 kilometres for preservation as 
nature reserves and national parks, and 36 for open space (free of all infrastructures and facilities).  
Thus  at  present  about  79  kilometres  are  undeveloped.    The  WTP  then  amount  to  €0.12  per 




4.3 Other Non-valuation Approaches 
Some information on the value of landscapes affected by development can be gleaned from other 
landscape  studies,  not  related  to  coastal  landscapes.    Arriaza  et  al  [15]  carried  out  a  survey 
requiring participants to rank the best and worst pictures in a series. The first few pages summarise 
the  theoretical/  philosophical  literature  on  what  landscape  is  and  methods  of  describing  and 
comparing  different  landscapes.  226  people  were  shown  10  panels,  each  with  16  randomly 
assigned photographs of the landscape in question (Andalusia, Spain). The photos were chosen to 
capture the relevant features of that landscape, with and without other features (e.g. olive trees 
with and without other herbaceous cover, with and without ‘pretty’ buildings, with and without 
industrial buildings). The best 4 and the worst 4 pictures in each panel were scored from +4 to -4.  
These scores were used as the dependent variable in a regression. A panel of researchers assigned 
each picture a score based on the pictures contents e.g. amount of water, presence of positive man-
made elements, and degree of wilderness according to a strict scoring system. They found that the 
degree  of  wilderness  and  positive  man-made  features  have  the  biggest  impact  upon  a  view’s 
desirability. The next most influential factors are the area of water and the colour contrast.  This 
seems to suggest that positive building, for example houses in keeping with the area, can increase 
the attractiveness of a view.   
 
This  study  uses  a  methodology  and  is  well  grounded  in  the  theoretical  side  of  landscape 
evaluation. However, it is unlikely that the results will be very transferable to coastal areas, since 
people value different landscapes for different reasons, e.g. positive manmade elements may be 
valuable in some agricultural landscapes such as Andalucía or the Cotswolds, but on coastlines 
they would be less welcome. 
 15 
Another approach to valuing landscapes is that of Dramstad et al. [16].  They used the Norwegian 
national monitoring programme for agricultural landscapes (the 3Q programme) as a case study, 
focusing on biodiversity, cultural heritage and human experience of the landscapes. A total of 
1474 sample squares of 1km x 1km distributed over the country in proportion to the amount of 
agricultural land. These are taken on a 5 year rotation, so changes are recorded after 5 years. The 
first round was in 1998.  
 
Dramstad  et  al  looked  in  particular  at  heterogeneity  in  landscapes  as  a  common  variable  in 
analyzing biodiversity, cultural heritage and human experience. Heterogeneity of land types is 
found by dividing the 1km square into 100 sub squares and seeing how many sub squares are 
different in land type to their neighbours. This forms the heterogeneity index.  Preferences for 
landscapes were found through asking people to rank photographs and text descriptions of the 
landscape  within  each  square.  Photographs  were  used  to  represent  clearly  defined  levels  of 
openness.  Increasing  heterogeneity  was  found  to  be  a  positive  change  for  all  aspects  of  the 
landscape-based values.  This partially supports the Arriaza et al. finding that landscapes with 
some human construction can be deemed attractive, but it does not provide data directly relevant 
to coastal zones.  Nor does it indicate which kinds of development are desirable.  Nevertheless the 
results are a useful warning that one should not regard all man-made development as ‘bad’ and 
that in some cases it can enhance the value of a landscape.  More work is needed on the valuation 
of coastal landscapes using this promising framework. 
 
As far as coastal landscapes are concerned a couple of studies have been conducted in the UK and 
one  in  Turkey  using  non-economic  approaches.    Morgan  and  Williams  [17]  asked  coastal 
managers and students to rank 70 beaches in Wales.  They found that the number of people on the 
beach did not significantly affect the scores given to different beaches, but undeveloped beaches 16 
scored better than those where anthropogenic structures were present.  Beach commercialization 
had an impact only on the rankings of the students.    
 
The other UK coastal study evaluated beach litter, to see which items were most offensive and 
which were less so (Tudrof and Williams [18]).  Not surprisingly people found items that were 
potentially harmful as the most offensive (syringes, gas canisters), followed by sewage related 
debris ( sanitary towels, condoms).  Least offensive were items of natural origin, such as seaweed 
and driftwood.   
 
The Turkish study (Ergin et al. [19]) develops measures of coastal scenery based on scores derived 
from a fuzzy logic analysis.  The methodology considers 26 coastal scenic assessment parameters 
which cover physical and human factors.  They find top preferences for beach goers in Croatia and 
Turkey were absence of sewage, water colour and absence of noise and buildings.  Access to the 
beach and landscape features appeared fifth and sixth respectively in Croatia. 
 
These kind of rankings could be linked to values of these different features of a beach but that has 
not been done as far as we can see. 
 
4.4 Conclusions on Valuation of Coastal Views and Access  
The value of beach access vary according to the services provides and degree of crowdedness.  
There appears, however to be range of between €5 and €30 per visitor per year for European 
studies and €5 to €15 for US studies, if we exclude some outliers.  In Israel, representing a lower 
income country values are also lower, at about €3.5.  The Israel study also provides the only non-
use value of conservation of €9.4 per household per year. 
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While the numbers obtained above are useful, they leave a lot or questions unanswered.  We do 
not know the value of an uninterrupted beach view when simply visiting a coastal area, and how 
this value is affected by coastal development or other factors relating to the beach.  Some of the 
non-valuation studies provide useful information but it still remains to link it to monetary values.   
We also do not know the impact on beach visits when access to the nearest beach is impeded.   Do 
individuals go to another beach further away (thus losing welfare) or do they go the same beach 
but incur a higher cost? 
 
5. Modelling Coastal Developments And Comparing Benefits And Costs 
In this section the data on values of landscapes are used to evaluate different policy options.  Two 
alternatives are considered: the first is the option of allowing a beachfront to be developed versus 
maintaining it as an undeveloped area and the second is the option of developing a whole area of 
coastline against a smaller area that is more intensively developed (i.e. ‘ribbon’ versus ‘cluster’ 
development).  In each case a large number of assumptions have had to be made to give the 
problem enough structure so that it could be analyzed numerically.  The main lessons, however, 
are, more general than the specific models generate.  These lessons are drawn out at the end of the 
section. 
 
5.1 Coastal Development Versus Conservation 
In this example a beach of length X km is taken.  In one case houses or hotels can be built along it 
of varying intensity.  Each house or hotel completely blocks the view of the beach from the road 
and visually dominates the beach.  The occupants of the properties have a complete unobstructed 
view of the sea and can access the beach at zero cost.  Other potential users and visitors to the 
region  currently  have  unimpeded  access  to  the  beach  and  a  clear  view  of  the  sea.    With  the 
construction  of  housing  or  hotels  they  could  face  total  restriction,  partial  restriction  or  no 18 
restriction.  In each case they will have a reduction in the benefits of the use of the beach, either 
because a visit now is more costly in time or because they have to go to another beach, further 
away. 
 
The coastal zone benefits of any development to the new occupants will now be: 
T = H.V.N  (1) 
 
Where H is the price of a house with frontage X/N, or the rate for the occupancy of a room in a 
hotel with such frontage, V is the percentage price premium for a coastal location and N is the 
number of homes or hotel rooms built along the front.  If H is proportional to the size of the 
frontage (a house or hotel with twice as much land as another has twice the basic price) the total 
benefits will be independent of the number of homes built
x.  Note that these benefits are a flow 
over the lifetime of the building.  To compare with the costs it is necessary to convert them into 
annual  benefits  at  a  certain  real  discount  rate  r  (i.e.  the  actual  discount  rate  less  the  rate  of 
inflation). 
 
The loss to existing users will be: 
 
L = B.P – B*.P*  (2) 
 
Where P people use the beach before development, with an average benefit of €B and P* people 
use  the  beach  after  development,  with  an  average  benefit  of  €B*.    For  the  moment  other 
beneficiaries, such as those who benefit from the view but do not visit the beach are ignored. 
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In addition there will be a loss of non-use value to people who do not visit but who prefer to see 
the coastline preserved un developed. 
 
Giving numbers to these values is difficult but some orders of magnitude are possible.  The ranges 
given in Table 4 can be considered plausible.  Two ranges are presented, one representative of 
housing development in a country such as Italy or France and the other in a country like Israel, 
which has lower use values for access to beaches.  In the first case we assume the development is 
housing  for  personal  occupation  and  in  the  second  it  is  hotels  with  much  higher  density  of 
occupation. 
 
Table 4: Values or Numerical Analysis of Development Vs. Conservation Option 
 
Variable  Label  Value Range  Comment 
Case A: Higher Use Values and Personal Housing Development 
Cost of Basic House  H  €400,000  Value is illustrative for house 
of 200M2 
Premium for Beach 
View 
V  25-80%  Taken from literature. This 
makes sea front house have a 
price of €500,000 to €720,000. 
APPLIED TO 50M. 
FRONTAGE 
Amenity from Using 
Beach Before 
Development 
B  €20  Taken from literature 
Number of Users 
Before Development 
P  3 
million/year 
no. of visitors at Marzetti for a 
2.5km beach near Trieste were 
3.1 mn. 
Case b: lower use Values but also include non-use value and Hotel Development 
Cost per hotel room  h  €80,000  Illustrative value FOR HOTEL 
WITH 3 FLOORS AND 30 
ROOMS 20 
Premium for Beach 
View 
V  40%  Taken from literature. This 
makes sea front hotel room 
have a price of €80, with a 60% 
occupancy rate, and ‘other’ 
costs of €50 per day of 
occupancy. APPLIED TO 
HOTEL WITH 50M 
FRONTAGE 
Amenity from Using 
Beach Before 
Development 
B  €3.5  Taken from literature 
Number of Users 
Before Development 
P  3 
million/year 
Base on Israel study with 31 
mn visitors over 24 km. 
Loss of non-use 
value 
NUV  €0.3/km/yr  applied to 2 million households 
basedon isreal study 
GENERAL PARAMETERS THAT APPLY TO BOTH CASES 
Length of Beach  X  2.5 km  Values are illustrative and not 
important to results 
Expected Duration of 
Dwelling 
T  40 years  Plausible value from literature 
Amenity from Using 
the Beach After 
Development 
B*  Results are quoted in terms of 
B* and P* 




Results are quoted in terms of 
B* and P* 
Discount Rate  R  5%  Typical real rate used in EU. 21 
 
The results are shown in Table 5.   They are presented in terms of the percentage loss of benefit 
for existing users.  In Case A we assume a lower density development of owner occupied housing.  
In this case if the present users lose 5 percent of their benefits, the total loss is €3 million, which is 
between 6 and 20 times the benefits to the new owners.  If the benefit loss is as high as 20 percent 
the social costs of the project exceed the benefits by between 25 and 82 times.  The ‘breakeven’ 
percentage – i.e. the percentage loss of benefits to existing users at which costs and benefits are 
equal – is 0.2 percent in the low case and 1.4 percent in the high case.  The actual loss is not 
known  and  would  be  complicated  to  calculate,  needing  a  model  of  household  travel  costs, 
increases in costs of access to the present beach and alternative beaches available.  But one can 
gain some idea from the relative numbers in Table 5.  A 5 percent decline in benefits is well below 
that shown in Table 3 for the Lido Di Dante, where the difference between a developed area and 
an undeveloped area is 28 percent.  A breakeven value of 0.8 percent (the average of the two 
values in Table 5) would imply a loss of €0.16 for a person with a net value of €20 for a visit to 
the beach.  If someone was earning €10 per hour, the value of leisure time could be taken as €3 (a 
30 percent of the gross wage is often used as the value of leisure). In this case the increase in time 
costs  imposed  by  the  development  would  have  to  be  only  3.2  minutes.    This  is  a  very  low 
additional cost and makes the case for conservation, with these values, very strong.  One should 
also recall that the losses of benefits to those who do not use the beach but are visually impacted 
by it are ignored.  Including these would make the case even stronger. 
 
Another sensitivity test would be to see how many beach users you would need to make the case 
for conservation.  In the above example the annual number of visits is taken as 3 million (from the 
Italian Lido Di Dante study).  With a loss of 5 percent of beach benefit from the users (which is 
very modest) one would need only 146,000 visitors a year.  More than that and the losses of the 22 
users would be greater than the gains from the developers.  A number of that magnitude would 
imply around 1200 visitors a day in the high season (July and August) and 600 visitors a day in 
the shoulder season (May and June, September and October).   
 
Table 5: Benefits and Costs of Beach Development Vs. Conservation 
CASE A  Low  High 
Benefits  €291,000  €932,000 
Costs   
With 5% loss  €3,000,000 
With 10% loss  €6,000,000 
With 20% loss  €12,000,000 
Breakeven % loss  0.5%  1.6% 
CASE B   
Benefits  €2,800,000 
Costs   
With 20% loss  €2,700,000 
With 30% loss  €3,800,000 
With 50% loss  €4,800,000 
Breakeven % loss  25.2% 
 
 
In Case B, where we assume a high-density development of hotels along the entire 2.5 km, the 
calculations are less favourable for conservation.  The value of the development is now much 
higher,  with  the  greater  number  of  occupants  (around  657,000  occupants  assuming  double 
occupancy and a 60 percent occupancy rate).  The losses of benefits to present users have to be 
around 25 percent for the conservation option to apply.  We have assumed a loss of non-use value 
here of €600,000, based on the figures given in Table 4.  Taking these out of the loss calculation 
leaves a required loss to users of €2.2 million, or €0.7 per visitor.  We assume a WTP of 3.5 per 
visitor, which means the required use value loss is around 20 percent of the present benefit, which 
is less than the difference between the value of a developed area beach and an undeveloped area 23 
beach in Italy.  Doing a calculation of the time cost such a development might impose let us 
assume an hourly average wage of €4 per hour and thus a value of time of €1.2 (using the same 30 
percent value of leisure time).  Then the beach development would have to impose an additional 
cost of 35 minutes to get to the nearest beach, which is plausible.  The other sensitivity test is to 
see  how  many  visitors  to  the  beach  we  need  for  the  losses  to  exceed  the  gains  to  the  hotel 
developers.  With a loss of 40 percent of beach use benefits the number of visitors would have to 
be at least 636,000.  Again, in the examples looked at, this would be a modest number for many 
situations. 
 
5.2 Ribbon Versus Cluster Development 
Another alternative option to consider would be to compare a ‘ribbon’ development along the 
entire coastline with a ‘cluster’ development, where a limited amount of coastline is taken up in an 
urban development and the rest is left untouched. 
 
Using  the  same  basic  data  as  in  Case  A  one  can  assume  that  the  development  of  the  entire 
coastline of 2.5 km. is replaced by a cluster development that takes up only 500 meters of the 
coast and extends back  to the mainland  for a depth of 5 dwellings.   So the number of units 
constructed is the same as in the ribbon development but they are clustered. 
 
The differences with respect to the previous ribbon development are the following: 
1.  Houses with a restricted view of the sea, in the second tier of houses will have values 
that are 8-27 percent of the value of houses in the first tier, declining linearly to zero 
by the last (5th tier).  This reflects the fact that they would have limited sea views and 
would be further from the sea. 
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2.  Losses to beach users will be lower.  Assuming the development is at one end of the 
beach, losses will be the same those as in the ribbon development for those who used 
that  part  of  the  beach  before,  and  will  reduce  linearly  down  to  zero  for  those  2 
kilometres from the development.  Figure 2 shows the assumed loss of value from the 
development 
 
Figure 2: Loss of Benefit from Cluster Development 
 
 
The results are shown in Table 6. The loss of benefits is much smaller with a cluster development 
than it is from a ribbon development – 60 percent lower in this example.  Similarly the generation 
of  benefits  is  also  smaller  to  owner/occupiers  –  down  by  about  67  percent.    The  conclusion 
remains, however that even this kind of cluster development has lower benefits than costs.  The 


















Table 6: Benefits and Costs of Ribbon Versus Cluster Development 
Ribbon development  Low  High 
Benefits  €146,000  €776,000 
Costs   
5% loss  €3,000,000 
10% loss  €6,000,000 
20% loss  €12,000,000 
Cluster Development  Low  High 
Benefits  €49,000  €155,000 
Costs   
5% loss  €1,200,000 
10% loss  €2,400,000 
20% loss  €4,800,000 
 
 
6. Conclusions And Recommendations For Regulation 
This paper looks at the growing pressure on coastal resources from ‘artificialization’ or conversion 
of natural habitats into man-made ones.  This pressure has been increasing steadily, at least since 
1970 and probably from before then.  Even since the 1990s when the problem has been recognized 
and attention devoted to tackling it, the rate of urban development along the coasts has continued 
to increase in most countries. 
 
The paper surveys briefly the regulations for coastal zone management and finds that integrated 
management, along the lines being discussed and proposed by researchers working on ICZM, is 
rarely  effective  in  its  implementation.    Legislation  is  now  in  place  in  several  countries  that 
purports  to  provide  the  right  regulatory  framework,  but  it  is  being  hampered  by  a  lack  of 
coordination between the regulating authorities (e.g. those responsible for land and sea and those 
responsible for different levels of government).  The presence of specific coastal legislation does 
not appear to guarantee a better performance in terms of coastal protection.  Lack of compliance is 
a  problem,  although  the  full  extent  of  it  is  not  known,  except  for  a  few  countries.    Illegal 26 
construction  is  a  frequent  phenomenon  and  is  encouraged  by  modest  fines,  the  granting  of 
amnesties for dwellings that have been in place for a number of years and the practice of applying 
a statute of limitations on legal proceedings against violators. 
 
It is not possible from the data available to establish how effective the different instruments such 
as  setback  policies  and  other  regulations  have  been  in  protecting  coastal  zones.  A  detailed 
assessment of the extent of violation of the setback rule therefore is needed.  But even that would 
provide only a fraction of the information that should be collected.  With a small setback area, at 
most a few hundred meters, a policy of intense development close to the sea is feasible and can 
result  in  a  coastal  zone  that  is  substantially  developed.    Thus  a  wider  assessment  of  the 
effectiveness of regulations by measuring outcomes is required.  Some limited evidence that is 
presented  is  not  encouraging  –  it  does  indicate  continued  and  increasing  pressure  on  coastal 
natural resources. 
 
The experience so far indicates that a stricter regime is needed to protect overdevelopment of 
coastal resources.  The practice of amnesties for illegal construction must stop and illegal units 
should be more frequently subject to demolition.  The use of normal planning regulations for land 
use needs to be buttressed by special conditions that apply to littoral zones that extend beyond the 
common range of 100-200 metres.  In these zones construction should be completely banned.  A 
second zone, perhaps up to one or even two kilometres, should be subject to special permission 
from an authority that is responsible of  ICZM  and that supersedes other planning authorities.   
Decisions on permitting development in this zone should be part of a strategic plan, in which the 
external costs and benefits as discussed in this paper are fully taken into account. 
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One possible regulatory tool could be the use of transferable development rights.  An authority 
that restricted development in one area would compensate those who lost value as a result of such 
a restriction by allocating rights in other areas.  Such systems have been an effective planning tool 
in municipalities and districts in the US and elsewhere. Alternatively authorities that were given 
coastal development rights could share the benefits with those where the rights were denied.  Such 
a system applies in Italy (the so-called ‘perequazione urbanistica’).  The system has allowed areas 
to be protected by arranging the transfer of benefits from other areas from as long ago as the early 
1980s.  (See Box 2).  
 
Box 2 
Box 2: Perequazione Urbanistica in Italy 
 
The idea behind the Perequazione Urbanistica is to share the benefits 
and  costs  of  changes  in  land  use  status  across  communities  and 
individuals.  So, if one community or person is given the rights to 
develop  land  from  agricultural  or  recreational  use  to  use  for 
dwellings, and another community is restricted not to develop land in 
this  way,  the  two  communities  may  share  the  benefits  from  the 
increased development. 
 
The scheme works by allocating to all residents in a given area the 
right  to  develop  a  part  of  their  land.    Then  planning  laws  are 
introduced which in effect prohibit the exercise of this right in some 
places. These laws also define certain areas of land for public use – 
roads, parks etc.  
 
Those  who  cannot  exercise  their  right  by  virtue  of  the  planning 
regulations can sell these rights to others so that they can develop 
more of their land than their right allocation allows.  Where the state 
needs  to  acquire  land  for  public  use,  it  does  so  at  the  agricultural 
value of that land, but this still allows the owner to sell the rights to 
development to another person who needs more than he or she has. In 
this way no one suffers from a planning restriction. 
 
The scheme has been applied in Italy specially to acquire land for 
public  services  with  resorting  to  compulsory  purchase  under  an 
Eminent Domain law or its equivalent.  But it has also been applied to 
ecologically oriented uses.  An example is the case of Cantù (near 
Como)  where  it  has  been  used  to  stop  the  urbanization  of  some 
Greenfield  areas.    Another  is  the  case  of  Chiavari  (near  Genoa)  
where further development of the hills above the resort town have 
been  deprived  of  development  rights,  but  these  can  be  exercised 
elsewhere. 28 
 
Another important instrument that can protect coastal development is land taxation.  It may be 
possible to tax increased land values when development rights are accorded for coastal areas and 
use the revenues for the protection of other areas, including transfers to these areas to make up for 
restricting development.  This serves a similar purpose as the perequazione urbanistica in Italy, 
except it uses a tax instrument. 
 
In general the authorities should seek to use fiscal instruments such as the above where possible.  
Given the difficulties in policing development, and the very strong incentives that individuals have 
to break the law by undertaking building in violation of planning regulations, it makes it much 
easier for the authorities to achieve their goals if costs of conservation are shared equitably.  That 
said, some degree of protection of the coasts will always be needed.  This can only be achieved if 
the political will is there.  
 
In any plan for coastal protection there will be positive and negative externalities to account for.  
The data available are limited and more needs to be collected on the value of beaches with and 
without development, the value of coastal landscapes without development and with different 
types of development, the costs of limited access to beaches and the ways in which beach users 
respond to increased development.  As this paper shows, however, the evidence is strongly in 
favour of conservation for plausible cases.  The benefits to owners and developers of beachfront 
developments  are  often  smaller  than  the  plausible  losses  to  beach  users.    Taking  account  of 
important non-use values will make the case for conservation even stronger.  Finally we note that 
the losses are much greater from ribbon development than for cluster development.  All these 
results need, however, to be strengthened with further research. 29 
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ENDNOTES 
i The only littoral states that have not been covered are Albania, Greece, Libya and Lebanon and 
Morocco.  Greece was excluded for reasons of time and the others because of a lack of information. 
ii There is no unique definition of coastal zone. The European Environment Agency (EEA, 2006) 
offers  the  following:  The  coastal  zone  is  interpreted  as  the  resulting  environment  from  the 
coexistence of two margins: coastal land defined as the terrestrial edge of continents, and coastal 
waters defined as the littoral section of shelf seas. Together they constitute a whole, which needs a 
specific methodological approach and dedicated management methods. Coastlines are determined 
from the Corine land cover data base (CLC). The terrestrial portion of the coastal zone is defined by 
an area extending 10 km landwards from the coastline. Where relevant, assessment of the basic 
coastal zone is enhanced by comparisons between the immediate coastal strip (up to 1 km), the 
coastal  hinterland  (coastal  zone  between  1  and  10  kilometre  line)  and  the  non-coastal  national 
territory, called inland.  The marine part of coastal zone is defined as  a zone extending 10 km 
offshore (i.e. as in Natura2000 coverage analysis) or a variable zone of shelf sea depending on the 
issue analysed (e.g. navigation routes, territorial waters, fisheries, coastal dynamics). The generic 
term  used  is  coastal  zone,  but  coastal  area,  coast,  coastal  space  and  coastal  systems  are  used 
synonymously to better accommodate the particular context. 
 
iii Notes for Table 2:  
Algeria.  The 100-300 m limit is in built up areas. Otherwise the limit is 0.5 km between settlements 
that are of 3km coastal length.  
Croatia. The sea limits for development are 300 meters.  
Turkey.  Laws applying to coastal zones include the Shore Law of 1990 (modified in 1992 and 
1994); Fisheries Law of 1971; Harbours Law of 1923 and Special Protected Areas Law of 1989.  
 
iv The study makes no comment on the somewhat curious result for the Whole Sample of Lido Di 
Dante in Autumn/Winter, which is out of line with the other results. 
v The average number of days spent on the seafront in Spring and Summer is 23.5 and in Autumn 
and Winter is 18.3; assuming these are equal numbers visiting in both seasons the average days per 
resident spent on the beach is 20.9. The report does not give clear indications of how the number of 
residents visiting the beach per season changes, but it does tell us that 73.5 percent visit the seafront 
in autumn and winter, suggesting it is if anything higher in winter. 
vi The two beaches are Headlands and Maumee Bay. The Ohio State Parks websites for them outline 
their key recreational features and are found at 
http://www.ohiodnr.com/parks/parks/headlnds.htm and 
http://www.ohiodnr.com/parks/parks/maumeebay.htm.  
vii Discussions with Israeli researchers revealed considerable doubts about the quality of this study.  
Nevertheless we include it as one of the very few that provides orders of magnitude estimates from 
a Mediterranean state. 33 
                                                                                                                                                 
viii The study also adds local expenditures by the municipalities to provide cleaning services etc. of 
NIS145 million a year.  In our view, however, this is not appropriate.  These outlays are a cost of 
providing  the  services  that  the  visitors  enjoy,  in  which  case  it  should be  subtracted  from  their 
expenditures to arrive at a net willingness to pay.  Since other estimates are not net values we have 
not made such a correction but equally we have not added the municipal expenditures to the visitors 
WTP. 
ix Given that the Israeli study is not published in a peer reviewed journal we must not place too 
much weight on it.  Nevertheless it is useful as  a gudie to what are probably plausible values. 
x T is now given as: T = α(X/N).V.N, where is the proportionality factor for a basic house. The 
resulting value is then α .X.V. NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI 
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